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This paper examines factors leading to increased intervention by central 
government in the railway sector during the second half of the nine­
teenth century. The focus is, largely, on the major companies, particu­
larly foreign enterprises in receipt of central government gold profit 
guarantees. It examines points o f contact between companies and the 
state in order to analyze the degree o f intervention in corporate affairs 
and the larger process of regulation which came to characterise railway 
construction and operations in Brazil. It will be argued that the nature of 
the Brazilian state and the novelty of railways, at mid century, resulted 
in a substantial level of initial supervision and state action. Thereafter 
the peculiarities o f railway financing contributed to sustain and deepen 
interventionism. The paper begins with an assessment of some episodes 
in early railway history that illustrate a leaming-by-doing process in 
state-business engagement. These episodes set the tone for subsequent 
relations. Attention is then given to key features of the guarantee system 
and official expectations about railway development, which contributed 
to legislative and attitudinal changes that conditioned policy and sub­
stantive developments after the turn of the century. The paper concludes 
by offering an explanation for the interventionist system that emerged in 
Brazil and lessons that might be learnt from the experience of this 
system in terms of current policy directions, specifically, privatisation 
and increased economic internationalism.
Railways: expectations and complications
Railways were regarded as significant by key public figures in the 
1850s and beyond. Political and economic actors assumed that infra­
structural modernisation would transform society and economy. Few,
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however, envisaged railways as challenging political institutions. Rath­
er, it was assumed that railways would strengthen the authority o f the 
central state. Perhaps this explains why large sums of public funds were 
made available to railway companies. It must, however, be remembered 
that the proportion o f state expenditure actually absorbed by railway 
companies was much greater than initially envisaged. There are no 
accurate figures for the amount o f public funds devoted by central and 
provincial/state governments to railways in Brazil. A not-very-exact 
proxy is provided by the distribution o f British investment in Brazil. 
Stone provides some of the highest absolute estimates and, as the Table 
below illustrates, argues that investment in railways accounted for more 
than one-third o f the stock of British capital placed in the country 
around the end of the Empire (1889) (Stone 1987: 153b).
Table: Sectoral distribution of British investment in Brazil 
(millions of pounds)







1865 £ 3.0 (64% ) £  5.4 (27% ) £ 0 .8  (4% ) - £ 1.0 (5% ) £ 2 0 .3
1875 £ 20.4 (66% ) £ 6 .4  (21% ) £ 2 .8  (9% ) - £ 1 .5 (4 % ) £ 3 0 .9
1885 £ 23.2 (49% ) £ 17 .0 (36% ) £ 3 .0  (6% ) - £ 4.2 (9% ) £ 4 7 .6
1895 £ 52.4 (56% ) £ 3 3 .1  (36% ) £ 3 .3  (4% ) - £ 4 .1  (4% ) £ 9 3 .0
1905 £ 83.3 (68% ) £ 24.0 (20% ) £ 6 .6  (5% ) £ 1 .7(1% ) £ 7.2 (6% ) £ 112.9
1913 £ 119 .6(47% ) £ 5 9 .1  (23% ) £ 55.0 (22% ) £ 9.1 (4% ) £ 11.9 (4% ) £ 254.8
Source: elaborated from  Stone (1987: 153b).
Between 1865 and 1885 Brazilian railways commanded the lion’s share 
of British investment in the sector in Latin America. Thereafter Argen­
tinian railways attracted more attention in London (Stone 1987: 73). 
Yet, as Stone would be the first to admit, his data underestimates the 
amount (and proportion) of British funds absorbed by Brazilian rail­
ways. In addition to specific railway debenture issues underwritten by 
the Imperial government for companies such as the domestically fi­
nanced Estrada de Perro Dom Pedro II (EPDPII) -  which was a private 
company until 1865 -  or the London-registered Bahia & São francisco 
Railway Company Limited (B&SPR), a large proportion of the ordinary 
internal and foreign public debt was probably absorbed by railway
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enterprises, used to cover the dividends of private companies and 
finance the construction (and deficits) of government lines. Whatever 
the absolute figures, after agriculture railways accounted for the largest 
share of fixed investment in nineteenth-century Brazil. It is also prob­
able that, after the 1860s, a very large proportion of recurrent central 
government expenditure found its way into the railway sector.
What was the result of this expenditure? Certainly not a national 
railway network, as was observed in 1887.1 At best there were loose 
regional groupings, often widely separated from each other and inter­
nally fragmented by breaks of gauge. Did the disjuncture between 
expectation and expenditure, on the one hand, and result, on the other, 
explain the degree of state intervention? Or did excessive regulation 
account for inefficiency, high-cost operations and frustrated develop­
ment? Almost from the outset it soon became clear that financing rail­
ways in Brazil would be an expensive exercise and that many o f the 
problems -  large and small -  lay outside the experience of policy­
makers. It also rapidly became obvious that foreign contractors and 
financiers were equally unfamiliar with the practicalities o f constructing 
and operating railways in Brazil.
Illustrative episodes: configuring business-state relations
Railways, inevitably, meant railway accidents. The early history o f rail­
way mishaps in Brazil provides insights into relations between com­
panies and the state and the extent to which even fairly mundane events 
could provoke larger, probably unimagined, consequences. One o f the 
first accidents occurred on the Recife & São Francisco Pernambuco 
Railway Company Limited (R&SFPR) during the early 1860s. A 
woman was struck and killed by an early morning ballast train. The 
engine driver was promptly arrested.2 In the case o f fatal accidents, 
Brazilian law required that the individual responsible should be held in 
custody pending enquiry. Given the delays involved in these proceed­
ings, the company faced considerable disruption to services (and fi­
1 M A C O P 1887: 175-176.
2 A EPPe EF V/24.
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nancial losses). Skilled employees such as locomotivemen were in short 
supply. The company pressed for release under licence.3 Persuading the 
authorities to do so proved a far from simple matter. A not dissimilar 
incident occurred in 1871 in São Paulo. An assistant guard was killed 
when a goods train and passenger train collided. In this instance, 
determining them to be the ‘responsible persons’, the chief of police 
ordered the arrest of the Superintendent and Traffic Manager of the San 
Paulo (Brazilian) Railways Company Limited on a charge of homicide.4 
The company responded by suspending services.
Whatever the legal position, companies protested that the reactions 
of over-zealous officials were disproportionate. They took little account 
of the complexities of railway operations nor of the distinct nature of the 
enterprise which were quite different in scale and organisation from 
existing systems o f transport such as mule trains or private carriage 
firms, an argument confirmed by the impact of a suspension o f railway 
services on the local economy. And there were further complications. 
The arrest of the R&SFPR driver prompted what may have been the 
first labour dispute involving skilled workers in modem Brazilian 
history. When news of the arrest of their colleague reached the loco­
motive depot, other drivers refused to take out their trains until he had 
been released.5 The company sought to resolve the problem by reaching 
an informal agreement with the imperial (central) government railway 
inspector whereby, in cases of fatal accidents, locomotivemen would be 
released on company surety pending official investigation.6 But it was 
rarely easy to persuade the police or provincial authorities to acknowl­
edge such informal arrangements, particularly when foreign nationals or 
foreign companies were involved. Confronted with worker intransi­
gence, the company was reduced to bluster or the threat o f sacking 
workers and recruiting others from Britain, a time-consuming and ex­
pensive exercise.7 The arrest of the SP(B)R Superintendent and Traffic 
Manager also indicated how a relatively minor event could escalate into
3 AEPPe EF V/25-6, AEPPe EF V/30-2.
4 FO 13/477: 104; PSP 1872: 61.
5 AEPPe EF V/25-6. 27-9, 34; R&SFPR 1862: 61.
6 AEPPe EF Vl/14-7, V/91-2; R&SFPR 1862: 61.
7 R&SFPR 1862: 3, 8-10; AEPPe EF V/39-41.
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a diplomatic incident. The chance visit o f two British warships to the 
port of Santos when the railway was in dispute with provincial police 
and judicial authorities, intemperate language by naval personnel and 
insistence by provincial and imperial governments that due process had 
to be observed conspired to trigger an outburst o f anti-British sentiment, 
notwithstanding attempts by both British and Brazilian officials to re­
solve matters speedily.8 Lengthy investigative procedures and pretrial 
delays were common in Brazil, occasioning frequent protests to the Rio 
de Janeiro Legation but the suspension of rail traffic was a blunt weap­
on, likely to provoke generalised local opprobrium.9
Arguably, labour recruitment and labour relations presented enter­
prises and authorities with a set of circumstances somewhat removed 
from traditional experience. In part these derived from the insertion of 
‘m odem ’ capitalist institutions into a society and economy where atti­
tudes to labour were hitherto conditioned largely by slavery and plan­
tation agriculture. Irrespective of whether they were registered in Brazil 
or foreign-owned, most early companies initially recruited labour 
abroad. The first railway built in Brazil, the EF Mauá financed with 
local capital and inaugurated in 1854, was constructed by a British 
contractor employing largely Irish and English labour.10 Most lines 
constructed in the 1860s and early 1870s also relied heavily on foreign 
contractors and construction workers. Similarly, once firms were opera­
tional, there was a continuing dependence on ‘expensive’ foreign work­
ers, even to perform fairly menial tasks. As the R&SFPR discovered, 
although bright and intelligent, Brazilian labour was unaccustomed to 
disciplined work. In order to inculcate suitable habits o f ‘discipline’ and 
‘vigilance’ it was necessary to pay wages considerably above those 
normally prevailing in the local economy."
Recruiting and retaining workers was a particular concern to the 
early companies. The issue was addressed in some company concession 
by exempting railway workers from military and jury service, a privi­
8 FO 13/477: 92, 96-114, 13/477: 119-20, 121-22; AESP 7879 1 T.I. EEFF 
1869/72.
9 FO  13/477: 57-9; A ESP 7879 1 T.I. EEFF 1869/72.
10 FO  13/315: 138-40.
11 R& SFPR  1862: 8-10.
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lege much appreciated in the late 1860s during the war with Paraguay.12 
However, ensuring that national guard recruiting sergeants honoured the 
concession was another matter.13 Perhaps this was rooted in an earlier 
aversion, reflected at the highest levels, to accord special privileges to 
railway concessionaires.14 The employment of foreigners, whether to 
construct or operate railways, meant introducing into Brazil groups of 
workers with a history of organisation and benefiting from consular 
protection. Railway navvies were notoriously given to “[...] combine in 
an attempt to rise their daily wages [...]”: arriving in Brazil, workers 
contracted by the R&SFPR promptly absconded or attempted to secure 
a one-third wage hike.15 If employers responded with the threat of 
imprisonment, workers did not hesitate to protest to consular officials 
and, sometime, the Brazilian authorities. Nor did workers demur from 
taking direct action. The success of organised protest tended to depend 
on the status o f workers and moment in the history of a particular com­
pany. Skilled workers almost inevitably enjoyed greater success than 
labourers, the exception being navvies engaged in the construction of 
the first lines. Piecemeal, issue-related action was also less likely to 
occasion a knee-jerk, violent response from companies or the authorities 
than efforts to establish structured organisations. Individual immigrant 
workers, o f course, were always susceptible to the threat of unemploy­
ment and destitution in a foreign land.16
Consular intervention on behalf of immigrant labour was not the 
only threat to Brazilian sovereignty in the area of labour relations. 
Slavery posed problems for companies and the state. Most foreign- 
registered companies were prevented from employing slaves, a require­
ment either imposed by the Brazilian government or insisted upon by 
shareholders. Yet this requirement was often honoured in the breach 
rather than the commission. Contractors, who were agents o f the railway 
companies, argued that they were not bound by engagements entered
12 A EPPe EF 1/21; CP 1870: 41; C l 1871: 23.
13 A EPPe EF 1/21; III/31; III/334-335.
14 A N /M T  IT3 105.
15 A EPPe E F III/36 -41 .
16 A EPPe EF III/21-28 V /25-6, 27-9, 34, VI/14-17; AESP. 1074, 279; R & SFPR  
1862: 61; FO  13/450: 194-5.
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into by the companies themselves. Obliged by its contract with the 
imperial and provincial governments not to employ slaves, the R&SFPR 
further promised prospective shareholders “[...] not to possess slaves, 
and not to employ in the work of construction other than free people 
[...]”.17 Yet the company was soon accused of either ignoring con­
tractual obligations or turning a blind eye to the use of slaves by 
contractors.18 Occurring in 1856, relatively soon after the effective end 
o f the trans-Atlantic slave trade to Brazil, the charge provoked a sharp 
response from the Foreign Office which accused the company of being 
in breach of its agreement with the Brazilian government and the British 
public. At a time when the British government was pressing the 
Brazilian authorities to liberate illegally imported slaves, the company 
was accused of giving encouragement to ‘African Slave Traders’.19
Brazilian action to prevent (or inhibit) foreign companies from 
employing slaves has been variously explained. The measure may have 
been tailored to the sensibility of British investors and designed to 
overcome a potential reluctance to venture funds in joint stock enter­
prises registered to operate in a slave economy. Alternately, the devise 
may have been conceived to prevent foreign companies competing with 
local enterprises in a tight labour market (Lewis 1991: 209). Whatever 
the intent, foreign investment in railways and importing gangs of 
construction workers to build the early lines and subsequent recruitment 
o f skilled workers changed the complexion o f the labour market just as 
paulista  planters were attempting to attract settlers to the new coffee 
frontier in the centre-west of the province. As the imperial and pro­
vincial governments were to find, immigrants -  whether contracted per­
sonnel or potential settlers -  brought with them foreign ideas and a 
degree o f foreign supervision. Neither were welcomed nor anticipated.
17 BR 1855: 2.
18 FO 84/996: 131-6.
19 FO  13/346: 143-4.
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F in an cin g  railw ays
Investment in railways enterprises -  whether by foreign firms or local 
capitalists -  occasioned new challenges for the state and transformed 
business-govemment relations, involving both the threat of external 
financial supervision and state regulation of private enterprises. The 
early history o f railway financing in Brazil was shaped by two inter­
related factors, a scarcity of domestic funds and the perceptions that 
external finance was readily available and cheap. Initial projects were 
also invested with political and economic expectations which were often 
unrealistic and sometimes irreconcilable. Together this combination of 
perceptions and expectations resulted in both initial mechanisms to 
promote private investment in railway development and the ultimate 
predominant role of the state in the sector.
In the 1830s and 1840s Brazilian policy-makers assumed that the 
country was ripe for railway development and that companies would 
earn spectacular profits. Hence, effective regulation was vital.20 Rail­
ways would promote economic modernisation by encouraging a spirit of 
enterprise and, in particular, stimulate production and trade by cutting 
transports costs, thereby increasing the value of, and return on, invest­
ment in other activities. Immigration would follow and labour costs 
fall.21 These assumptions ignored the technical difficulties of building 
railways in much of the central coastal region of the country and the 
generally low level of market activity. The topography of coastal Brazil 
meant that companies were operating at -  or beyond -  the existing fron­
tier o f railway technology, with the inevitable consequences for con­
struction and operating costs and quality of service delivery. Nonethe­
less, expectations that railway operations would be profitable coloured 
official attitudes, further inculcating the natural tendency of the imperial 
bureaucracy to supervise, to regulate and to intervene. In official circles 
this resulted in a suspicion -  not entirely without foundation -  that 
commercial enterprises were intrinsically corrupt. Given the inherent 
monopoly power of public utilities, successful companies were viewed
20 AN IT3 105; PSP 1852:41-3 .
21 PSP, 1855: 42-3, 1856: 33.
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as abusing their position to milk the public while less profitable firms 
castigated for a culture of dependence on the state.
Irineu Evangelista de Sousa, subsequently baron and later viscount 
Mauá, a Brazilian entrepreneur cast in the historic mould, suffered few 
delusions about financing railways in Brazil (Marchant 1965). Observ­
ing that his company, the EF Mauá, was finally profitable and declaring 
a dividend o f 8%, a rate much better than anything obtainable in Lon­
don, he recognised that railways were unlikely to attract local investors. 
While 8% would confirm to British investors the profitability of 
railways, Brazilians demanded more and would not tie up their capital 
in projects that required a lengthy gestation period before realising a 
return.22 Railways projects were lumpy, absorbed huge amounts of 
capital and required a substantial profit lead-in period. The technology 
was new and -  in Brazil in the 1850s -  largely untried while organisa­
tion and operation also necessitated novel forms of managerial exper­
tise. In these circumstances it was hardly surprising that Brazilian 
official and railway promoters looked overseas for funds and personnel.
By the mid-nineteenth century, in most countries the railway sector 
had come to be regarded as an area where the state would have to play 
at least an enabling role. The alternatives were direct official funding 
and operation or substantial state support for the private sector. The 
latter implied supervision and regulation. By the 1860s, in Latin Ameri­
ca and elsewhere, dividend guarantees underwritten by the state were 
gradually displacing ad hoc forms of official aid for railways (Lewis 
1983). By the mid-1860s the official optimism of earlier decades was 
tempered with realism as losses accumulated and the quotation of 
Brazilian railways securities slipped in London. While castigating the 
capriciousness of foreign stockmarkets, policy-makers acknowledged 
that railways had not been an immediate success nor were enterprises as 
profitable as anticipated.23 The magnitude of technical difficulties con­
fronting promoters pushing lines over the coastal escarpment slowly 
dawned. Problems of topography were compounded by inexact knowl­
edge of the terrain and a lack of skilled personnel and equipment. Un- 
familiarity with the administration of railways also pushed up operating
22 IHGB C oleção M auá, 515: 11-43.
23 M A C O P 1864: 14, 1866: 64, 1867: 100.
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changes. In Europe, construction was easier, resources more plentiful 
and traffic greater.24 There was also growing anxiety in official circles 
about the impact of demands being made upon the local capital market 
by nationally-owned lines.25 These imperatives contributed to the quest 
for foreign funds and an acceptance of the inevitability o f the profit 
guarantee system. By the end of the decade there were eight railways in 
operation: one, the EFDPII, initially financed with private and state 
capital had been nationalised; three pioneer lines in the provinces of 
Bahia, Pernambuco and São Paulo were registered overseas and were 
provided with joint imperial and provincial profit guarantee; three 
further companies, operating in the provinces o f Bahia, Rio de Janeiro 
and São Paulo, benefited from provincial guarantees; two companies, 
both in Rio de Janeiro, functioned without guarantees. State action o f 
this order was necessary because in the seventeen years since the inau­
guration of the first company, less than 400 miles of track had been laid: 
in a similar period a railway network o f more than 3,500 miles have 
been built in the USA.26
By the 1860s, profit guarantees had become a fairly conventional 
means of promoting direct, private investment in railways. The system 
was envisaged as a temporary expedient, promising shareholders a 
reasonable rate o f return on investment during the development phase of 
operations until earnings were sufficient to provide an adequate divi­
dend. Variants of the system operated in Europe, Latin America and 
Asia. At this stage the going rate in Latin America was around 7%. The 
principal novelty of the Brazilian guarantee system was that the central 
(imperial) government covered 5% while the provinces provided an 
additional 2%. Provinces offering a guarantee on their own account, an 
increasingly common practice in São Paulo during the 1870s, usually 
provided 7% (Lewis 1991; Love 1980: 64). Imperial guarantees were 
paid in gold while the provinces offered paper, the exception being the 
supplementary guarantees awarded to the B&SFR, R&SFPR and 
SP(B)R. (The imperial government assumed responsibility when the 
provinces o f Bahia and Pernambuco were unable to honour obligations
24 M A C O P 1866: 65, 1867: 100.
25 M A C O P 1862: 22, 1864: 15; El Karah 1982.
26 M A C O P 1869: 33-4.
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to the B&SFR and R&SFPR respectively.)27 As dividends were normal­
ly guaranteed for a specific period, for the imperial government, the 
system was an alternative to earlier, open-ended methods of support. 
The imperial government had been pressed to invest in several pioneer 
companies and to guarantee and service railway corporate debt.28
Although profit guarantees were an established practice by the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century, the system came to haunt both the 
Brazilian government and the companies. Limited in time and devised 
as a loan rather than a grant (advances were to be repaid out o f future 
profits), it soon became obvious that several lines were committed to a 
long-term dependence on state subsidies. Railway companies claimed 
that a failure to cover guaranteed returns on investment would jeop­
ardise Brazil’s credit in overseas financial centres. Indeed, as guarantee 
payments mounted inexorably, government credit was questioned, ulti­
mately provoking the nationalisation o f some lines. For its part, the im­
perial government tended to regard railways failing to cover dividends 
from operating profit as at best inefficient or, worse, corrupt. Paradoxi­
cally, profitable enterprises were also caught in the guarantee trap. Even 
after earnings were more than sufficient to pay dividends at or above the 
guaranteed level and earlier state profit subsidies had been repaid, 
companies found governments anxious to retain a claim on future earn­
ings, possibly as a means of cross-subsidising weaker lines.
By 1873 operating profits o f the London-registered San Paulo 
(Brazilian) Railway more than covered the guarantee. As per the origi­
nal concession, the company was obliged to divide earnings above 8% 
with the government. Some fourteen years later, as total payments to the 
imperial government were approaching the sum previously paid out by 
the government under the guarantee, the company began to contemplate 
abrogating the guarantee clauses in its concession.29 By the end of 1887, 
with a final instalment of approximately £ 90,000, the company had 
covered the £ 518,443 profit guarantee received from the imperial 
government and reserved the right to renounce the guarantee, a course
27 M A C O P 1863: 12.
28 M A C O P 1869: 35-7.
29 Itam arati 413 - 3 - 425.
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apparently recognised by the government.30 Yet it was to take almost 
three years before the issue was settled. The company protested at the 
delay, which it depicted as a ‘tax’ on the company and the province (as 
rail freights were being maintained at an artificial level by the govern­
ment in order to ensure official participation in ‘excess’ profits above 
8%). Exasperated at what it regarded as official procrastination, the 
company threatened to take unilateral action.31 The provincially fran­
chised, p a u lis ta -o vm ed  Companhia Paulista seems to have found nego­
tiating guarantee renunciation with the São Paulo authorities somewhat 
less fraught though not necessarily less time consuming.32
By the end of the Empire, the central government had underwritten 
railway profit guarantees totalling 167,021: 299S678 per annum. At this 
stage many guaranteed lines were running a deficit while those that 
were not were only just able to cover operating costs leaving hardly any 
net surplus to provide dividends. In addition, all but three of the ten 
companies owned by the government were also operating at a loss. It 
was an enormous burden for the national exchequer.33 By 1886/7 the 
central government had, over the years, paid out a total of £ 12.8 million 
to seventeen companies. O f these only two had repaid (or were repay­
ing) past advances.34 At this point the outstanding central government 
sterling debt stood around £ 23 millions.35 Doubts had been expressed 
about the system almost twenty years earlier. Already in 1865 the 
R&SFPR and B&SFR were regarded as bottomless pits into which the 
government was pouring treasure. According to ministry officials, 
burdened with over-blown administrations, the discredited directors of 
these companies displayed greater zeal in pressing fanciful claims upon 
the government than in developing the earning potential of their respec­
tive zones.36
30 Itam arati 413 - 3 - 425, 414 - 545E; PSP 1889: 112.
31 Itam arati 413 - 3 - 425, 414 - 4 - 545E; A N /M inisterio  dos T ransportes: 151/6,
10226, 151/8, s/no.
32 CP 18 7 5 :4 3 -5 1 , 1876: 11, 1877: 60-2, 1878: 9, 1882: 7-8.
33 M A C O P 1889: 168-9.
34 M A C O P 1887: 171; RT 1888: 286.
35 1BGE 1987: 541.
36 A EPPe EF II/323-7, AN/M T: 161, 2865/2-383-4; M A C O P 1866: 71-2, 75.
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Official anxiety at the apparent guarantee dependence o f some 
pioneer railways (notably those in receipt of gold guarantees) and 
spiralling claims on the imperial treasury was tempered by government 
desire to encourage railway expansion. Successive reports to parliament 
underscored the importance attached by government to fostering trans­
port improvement (Lewis 1991a; 1991b: 201-202). Strategic and politi­
cal considerations shaped national railway strategy. Yet, while extolling 
railways as a symbol and the substance of modernity, imperial agencies 
were compromised by the spiralling costs of sustaining a ‘national’ 
railway project. Several attempts were made to address financial and 
administrative deficiencies o f the guarantee system. These ranged from 
piecemeal measure to increase the earning potential of individual com­
panies to proposals for root and branch reform.
As B&SFR and F&SFPR guarantee payments mounted in the 
1860s, a two-fold official response emerged -  procrastination over the 
settlement of guarantee claims and schemes to foster rail traffic growth. 
The procedure to verify company capital expenditure and operating 
accounts ground fine and exceedingly slow, triggering inevitable pro­
tests from the companies and threats to expose official bad faith.37 
Initially, road improvement in the vicinity of guarantee-dependent lines 
was the preferred device to encourage traffic and revenue growth. By 
improving access to stations, feeder roads might extend the frontier of 
market production.38 Subsequently, the solution to low traffic and earn­
ings would be state railway building, narrow gauge main line extensions 
and branch line additions to the board gauge B&SFR and P&SFPR -  the 
policy o f prolongamento. During the War of the Triple Alliance, when 
the Argentine, Brazil and Uruguay had fought Paraguay, few new 
railway projects had been inaugurated in Brazil. However, as the war 
drew to a close, several new schemes were essayed in São Paulo. By the 
end of the 1860s these took concrete form when provincial concessions 
were issued to locally-financed companies.39 By 1870 about 200 miles 
of line were under construction, all bar 20 miles in São Paulo.40 Else­
37 AEPPe EF 11/323-7,11/179-82; R&SFPR 1863.
38 MACOP 1867: 110; AN/MT: 162.
39 PSP 1867: 46-7, 1868: 25-30, 1870: 24-8.
40 MACOP 1871: 102.
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where, encouraging new construction proved more problematic. This, 
and the burden of gold guaranteed, triggered a reappraisal the regulatory 
framework governing the authorisation and supervision of railway 
projects, the thrust of the reform being to simplify procedures and give 
the provinces greater autonomy.41 Particular attention was paid to ex­
tending lines in Bahia and Pernambuco and constructing a strategic 
network (‘military’ railways) in the far south.42
The railway law of 1873 (lei no. 2237 of 3 May 1873) and asso­
ciated financial decree 2450 of 24 September 1873, implemented by the 
regulamento of the following year was the first major recodification 
since the railway law of 26 July 1852. These measures were subse­
quently complemented by decree 6995 of 10 August 1878 which de­
termined the rate at which financial obligations incurred in paper 
currency were to be converted into sterling. Driven by perceived short­
comings in the existing guarantee system, in addition to conferring free­
dom on the provinces, the act attempted to standardise and streamline 
regulations governing railway operations as well as the granting of 
concession, obliquely admitting that the previous system was too inter­
ventionist.43 The principal modification resulting from the law and 
decree related to state support for private lines. The decree provided a 
mileage subvention or guarantee for projects which could demonstrate 
a net earning capacity of 4%. In either case, support was limited to 
30 years. The 1852 act permitted the granting of guarantee for up to 
90 year. Limits were also placed on the maximum capital sum to be 
guaranteed: previously the limit had been recognised constructions costs 
per mile. The period during which the state might elect to expropriate a 
line was reduced from 30 to 15 years: it was thought that the existence 
of an extended period during which the state had to right to purchase a 
line generated uncertainty. The ‘zone of privilege’, the region within 
which other lines might not be franchised was reduced marginally, from 
20 miles on either side of the track (33 kms) to 18 miles (30 kms). 
Harmonising concessions granted to individual enterprises, the new act
41 M A C O P 1873: 65-9.
42 M A C O P 1873, 1874: 102, 105-6, 106-12; Ew bank da C am ara (1874: 30).
43 M A C O P 1875: 70-77.
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provided for the duty free import o f railway equipment and material 
while coal was to be free of duties for 30 years.
By 1879 there were approximately 1,800 miles o f railway in opera­
tion in Brazil with a further 1,200 miles under construction.44 However, 
if  the new legislation was designed to promote private -  particularly 
foreign -  investment, it was relatively unsuccessful. In 1881 state enter­
prises were operating a network o f some 600 miles with a similar mile­
age under construction. Private companies (essentially locally funded 
firms) were operating approximately 350 miles of track with virtually 
three times this figure under construction. Companies guaranteed under 
the old system, basically foreign registered concerns, had built nothing 
beyond mileage specified in their original concessions.45 Meanwhile, 
most state lines operated at a deficit and payments to unprofitable com­
panies enjoying gold guarantee continued to burden the imperial ex­
chequer. By 1883 state-owned lines had a little less than 1,000 miles in 
operation with a further 450 miles under construction. Companies li­
censed exclusively under the 1873 legislation were operating something 
over 600 miles while laying around 300 miles.46
The time was ripe for another change o f policy. In 1887 Antonio 
Prado, Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works proposed 
the formulation of yet another national railway programme. At this point 
it was estimated that approximately £ 11-13 million [102,370: 513$517] 
had been paid out in profit guarantees, half of which had been absorbed 
by two companies, the B&SFR and R&SFPR.47 Unsurprisingly, once 
again the cardinal objective was to reduce the burden on the exchequer. 
Cross-subsidisation and economies o f scale lie at the heart of the pro­
posal which envisaged the formation of regional networks, particularly 
in the north-east. This would reduce operating costs, facilitate the flow 
of traffic and generate revenue (Rodrigues 1902: Appendix 1; 101-102). 
Over thirty years after the inauguration of the first line, it was acknowl­
edged that the lack of a national railway plan had resulted in a collection 
of regionally isolated networks, separated by distance and breaks of
44 M A C O P 1880: 231-7.
45 M A C O P 1882: 213-5.
46 M A C O P 1884: 255.
47 M A C O P 1887: 171; RT 1888: 286.
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gauge -  a defect only gradually being remedied. Founded upon an 
insufficiency of basic data, the priority of early railway strategy was the 
construction o f cheap lines into the interior. Subsequently there was a 
shift towards the building of strategic lines, for example in Rio Grande 
do Sul in 1873. Little cognizance was taken of future development 
needs and railways were prioritised when a more rational use might 
have been made of the river system.48
Bureaucratic soul-searching in the declining years o f the Empire 
yielded a strategy that would only reach partial fruition during the 
Republic -  expropriation and leasing (Duncan 1932). Regional net­
works, to be forged from an amalgamation of state-owned railways and 
expropriated loss-making guaranteed lines, would be leased to private 
operators. A year before the fall of the monarchy an imperial agent had 
been despatched to London to present expropriation terms to the 
directors of the B&SFR and R&SFPR, returning to London a year after 
the declaration of the Republic (Rodrigues 1902: Appendix 1; 101-102, 
Appendix 2; 103-104). The scheme, which prefigured some current 
Latin American privatisation proposals, foundered on the intransigence 
of the British companies and the need for further state expenditure to 
integrate and upgrade the networks, all of which depended on the ability 
of the new regime to secure an agreement with European creditors for a 
funding loan in a period of political instability and financial turmoil 
associated with the transition from empire to republic (Franco 1983). 
The government was also loathe to part with profitable lines while pri­
vate operators were disinclined to bid for companies with a history of 
loss-making. Yet, by the end of the century three small north-eastern 
lines had been leased and, in two cases, had turned losses into operating 
profits.49
At the beginning of the twentieth century Brazil was in a position to 
expropriate the British-owned north-eastern railways, bringing to a 
close the system of gold guarantees begun half a century earlier, thereby 
giving substance to network leasing projects which had emerged fitfully 
in the 1890s (Duncan 1932). Brazilian international credit was restored 
when agreement was finally reached with foreign banks. The 5%
48 MACOP 1887: 170, 174-6.
49 BR 1899: 300; R T  1899: 720-1.
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funding loan floated between 1898 and 1900 to cover the coupon on 
existing issues has been described as a watershed in pre-First World 
War economic policy. In the face of considerable domestic opposition, 
the federal government agreed to a programme of deflation while build­
ing-up holdings of foreign reserves (Fritsch 1988: 7; Halsey 1977: 120). 
Shortly thereafter (and somewhat against the letter o f the funding 
agreement which placed a ten-year embargo on new loans) Brazil issued 
a series of railway guarantee recession bonds between 1901 and 1905 to 
buy out private interests, mainly in the north-eastern railways (Halsey 
1977: 120; Economist 1901: 1656). London directors finally agreed to 
place before shareholders government proposals for a buy-out.50
The legacy of the guarantee system
With the possible exception o f São Paulo, the history of dividend 
guarantees in Brazil was largely one of failure. The arrangement was 
essential if  private investment in the sector was to be stimulated and 
sustained. Yet few companies were ever able to cover the guaranteed 
rate o f return from net operating profits, the reasons for which lie 
outside the scope of this study (Duncan 1932; Lewis 1983: 225-278). 
The system, however, had an immediate and lasting impact upon 
business-state relations in the railways sector and, possibly, beyond. In 
official and technocratic circles, and later amongst the population at 
large, guaranteed lines -  particularly foreign-owned companies -  came 
to be seen as inefficient, exorbitant monopolies. This view underpinned 
the campaign by bureaucrats and the engineering community in the 
1880s for railway nationalisation.51 The result was a legacy o f inter­
vention at company level in addition to regulation at sectoral level. By 
the end of the nineteenth-century, railway regulatory agencies were to 
be found in most countries. Arguably, what distinguishes Brazil is the 
degree of official engagement in day-to-day company decision making. 
The picture that emerges is of a state unable to co-ordinate macro strat­
egy but intervening in virtually every aspect of operations.
50 IHGB 585, R & SFPR  1901.
51 C lube de Engenharia 1882; RT: 855-6.
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Guaranteeing profits, of necessity the state took an interest in cons­
truction and operation costs. Railway concession provided that capital 
accounts had to be verified by the franchising authority -  central or 
provincial government, sometimes both -  in order that capital should be 
recognised for guarantee purposes. Similarly, operating data was 
scrutinised by licensing agencies to determine allowable expenses and 
the extent o f subsidy required to meet the guarantee. Entirely logical, 
the smooth operation of the system assumed a degree o f goodwill 
amongst all parties. This was sometimes lacking or evaporated in the 
face o f disagreement.
In the long-run, Brazil scrupulously honoured profit guarantee 
obligations but, during period o f financial stringency, the government 
had every incentive to procrastinate. Inadequate route planning and 
costing inevitably occasioned misunderstanding and antagonism. Hav­
ing been prepared to give the company the benefit of most o f their 
earliest doubts, official were, for example, taken aback by the lengthy 
delays and mounting costs associated with the completion o f the first 
section of the R&SFPR. Requests by the company for an increase in 
authorised (guaranteed) capital provoked first alarm and subsequently 
outrage as a series of technical difficulties and natural disasters delayed 
construction, ultimately triggering demands for the expropriation of the 
company.52 The experience o f the R&SFPR was not untypical. Almost 
all early Brazilian railways were under-costed: technical problems and 
the cost of acquiring land meant that original estimates were wholly 
inadequate.53
The experience inculcated amongst political figures a suspicion of 
enterprise and amongst bureaucrats a habit of scrutiny, dispute and re­
ferral to ‘higher authorities’. It also resulted in direct government action 
in areas which in other circumstances might have remained the province 
of firms and shareholders or companies and customers. In effect, even 
mundane commercial operations became highly politicised. A few ex­
amples of the resulting culture o f scrutiny and intervention will suffice.
52 PP 1856: 65; AEPPe EFII/179-82, 111/208-9, 11/281-98; Ottoni 1866: 23-6; FO 
13/356.
53 FO 13/330, 13/356; R&SFPR 1857, 1862: 3-7; Itamarati 413 - 3 - 422; Ottoni
1866.
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Guarantee regulations required companies to justify each and every call 
for capital. Routinised and time-consuming, the process was no 
safeguard against corruption, as EF Sorocabana shareholders learnt 
when it was discovered that a former chairman had appropriated capital 
raised by company stock issues for his own purposes.54 With monoto­
nous regularity, company chairmen and secretaries sought authority to 
make calls on subscribed, recognised share issues. In the case of com­
panies registered in Britain, requests were addressed to the Brazilian 
Minister in London who referred them to Rio de Janeiro. Locally 
financed railways addressed their requests to the president of the 
province who in turn forwarded details to the Imperial government.55 
São Paulo politicians bemoaned the conflicts of provincial and imperial 
jurisdictions in the awarding of railway concessions as early as 1873.56 
Supervision and indecision o f this order irked. By the end of the Empire 
paulista  entrepreneurs were becoming increasingly critical about the 
‘inconvenience’ o f referral to Rio de Janeiro.57
At some point in the second half of the nineteenth century virtually 
all governments assumed the power to regulate rail freight. Most Latin 
America railway franchises specified that tariffs required official ap­
proval, the level at which rates were set usually being referred to a 
given gross or net return on investment. In Brazil, non-state railways 
eschewed the philosophy of developmental tariffs. Freights were 
normally fixed at a level marginally below prevailing charges levied by 
high cost competitors -  muleteers and carters. Guarantee authorities 
sustained this strategy. Company proposal for even fairly modest down­
ward revisions in rates were countered by exhaustive analysis.58 Rather 
than tariff reductions, in the early years, government was more likely to 
sanction sur-charges to raise extra revenue.59 Unauthorised downward 
adjustments of freights usually triggered a swift, if  oblique response.60
54 Correio Paulistano 1880: 2e-3b; CS 1882: 3-4.
55 Itamarati 413 - 3 - 423; FEPASA, Copiador “A”.
56 SP 1873: 112-24.
57 CP 1884: 6-7, 1884: 9.
58 AEPPe EF I.
59 Itamarati 413 - 3 - 422; PSP 1868: 42-3, 1868: 9.
60 PSP 1868: 10.
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Yet, as indicated above, it was the refusal of the imperial government to 
permit SP(B)R tariff reductions at the mid-1880s which occasioned 
greatest protest.61
Given the cost of the guarantee system, official anxiety to vet capital 
and operating accounts and, where possible, to milk the tariff was 
understandable. Action in other aspects of railway operations was less 
immediately comprehensible. The R&SFPR was required to submit for 
government approval schemes for the transhipment of cargo from the 
main depot to the port.62 When trains failed to run to timetable, a 
reprimand would be issued from the presidential palace.63 Little wonder 
that railway officials felt it necessary to apply to government house for 
authorisation to run excursion trains.64 Less mundane requests for minor 
route realignments were appraised as if  a new concession was being 
sought.65 Changes to construction specification were similarly subject to 
exhaustive re-examination.66 Lines franchised during the second wave 
of railway construction in the 1870s were, as companies organised in 
the 1850s, subject to the contesting claims of competing local interests, 
all clamouring for distinct routes.67 The outcome was delays, increased 
costs and a culture of layered -  regional, provincial and national -  
political intervention in railway route planning.
Explaining the culture of intervention
The extent o f government involvement in railway development and 
official involvement in the affairs of individual companies -  interven­
tion at macro and micro levels -  in Brazil in the second half o f the 
nineteenth century can be explained by a number o f factors. First, the 
nature of the Brazilian state; secondly, the character o f railway
61 CP 1883: 10, 1884: 6, 1884: 8-9, 1885: 3-4.
62 A EPPe EF III /3 18-9.
63 A EPPe EF I I I / l59-61, 164-66.
64 A EPPe EF 11.
65 Itam arati 413 - 3 - 422.
66 A EPPe EF III/141-2, III/145-8.
67 E l-K areh (1980); Lassance C unha (1909); Lewis (1991); Pereira da  Silva (1904).
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enterprises; and, finally, expectations triggered by infrastructural mod­
ernisation.
Although in economic terms an archipelago of regions, the Brazilian 
Empire was a highly centralised polity. Constitutionally, the remit o f the 
central (imperial) government was large and the autonomous space 
allowed to provincial administrations limited. Formally a constitutional 
monarchy, a great deal of discretion was accorded to the Crown -  the 
so-called moderating powers. Vested in the Emperor, these were 
exercised through the Council of State. The political class was small, 
enjoyed a great deal of political independence from regional economic 
elites and was bound together by links of education, marriage and self- 
interest. The political class enjoyed the substance and reality of power?8 
It was also committed to a Gerschenkronian ‘project’ which vaunted the 
state and conceived of political authority as a mechanism to integrate 
and modernise Brazil. In this railways, as any other entities or sectors, 
were subordinate to, or explicitly licensed in pursuit of, that project. The 
result was a clash of cultures -  between modem business enterprises in 
formation and a bureaucracy imbued with neo-mercantilist sentiments.
Railway enterprises were not unique in receiving state support or 
being regulated. Subventions and company specific subsidies were, 
from time to time, available to investors venturing capital in other 
activities in pre-1889 Brazil (Eisenberg 1874; Topik 1987). According 
to Topik this tradition was carried forward into the Republic, certainly 
as regards the railway sector was concerned and notwith-standing com­
mitments to economic liberalism (Topik 1987: esp. 93-09). Arguably, 
attitudes to private business were best signalled by the highly-restrictive 
regime governing the formation of limited companies in force for much 
of the period from the 1850s to the 1880s. Economic initiatives were re­
garded both as deserving of state support and with suspicion. In a 
predominantly agrarian and commercial economic structure, the attitude 
to railways, public utilities and even manufacturing was ambivalent. 
Even when viewed as essential, firms were still seen as threatening, 
particularly when foreign capital was involved. Local interests and 
policy-makers were anxious that enterprises should not become ‘a state
68 M urilo de Carvalho (1980); Faoro (1975); Pang (1988); U ricoechea (1980).
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within a state’ (Galvão Queiroz 1884: passim, esp. 17, 27-28). But 
railways were different from other enterprises. As is well known, the 
magnitude o f investment, scale o f operations and organisational 
complexity o f railways effected a managerial as well as a technical 
revolution. Even in Great Britain by the 1840s it was recognised that 
state action was required. Considerations o f safety, the monopoly 
character o f enterprises, the need to police private financing, all 
compelled governments to act or to establish regulatory frameworks. In 
some continental European countries, like Belgium, state railway 
monopolies were established, in others mixed entities emerged or a pri­
vate-public sector partnership was essayed, as for example in France 
where the state initially assumed responsibility for the basic infrastruc­
ture, leasing track operating rights to private firms. But in Brazil the 
disparities between state aspiration and state competence were greater 
and the distance between state and private initiative relatively larger. 
Perhaps this accounted for the degree of ‘micro-interventionism’ in 
corporate decision-making.
The introduction of foreign finance (indeed, the initial assumption 
of a dependence on overseas capital) also fuelled interventionism. 
W hether during the Empire, adjusting to the end of the transatlantic 
slave trade and the slow, phased, abolition o f slavery and mounting 
foreign borrowing, or during the first decade or so of the Republic when 
debt and monetary disorder appear likely to result in external financial 
supervision, nationalist sentiment were never far from the language and 
form of policy. In 1913 the Brazilian foreign public debt was around 
£ 103.8 million, £ 16.6 million of which have been issued at the 
beginning of the century to buyout guaranteed railways (Halsey 1977: 
119, 120; Duncan 1932). A generation earlier, at the end o f the o f the 
Empire, cumulative guarantee payments to railway companies ac­
counted for a much larger share of the debt. This burden and the 
pressure o f gold guarantees upon the exchequer and the exchange 
contributed to the climate of nationalism, intervention and suspicion of 
foreign companies. Requests by London-registered companies for Brit­
ish diplomatic assistance did nothing to allay these fears.69 Official
69 FO  13/438: 5-6, 13/437: 9-15, 128/102: 262-5, 13/511: 13.
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British pressure on Brazil over the slave trade and slavery coupled with 
the example o f highly profitable London companies such as the SP(B)R 
and guarantee dependent lines like the B&SFR and the P&SFPR 
ensured that sensitivity about national sovereignty and the exploitative 
nature o f foreign enterprises remained to the fore. Similarly, financial 
chicanery such as that associated with the EF Sorocabana and demands 
emanating from virtually all early companies -  from the nationally 
owned EFDPII to the British registered gold guaranteed lines -  for an 
increase in recognised guaranteed capital convinced some officials that 
every enterprise was tarred with the same brush. They were speculations 
rather than public works, organised by greedy unpatriotic (or foreign) 
capitalists intent on exploiting government generosity. A pre-disposition 
to bureaucratisation, coupled with nationalism and the sheer novelty of 
railways ensured that corporate operation would be closely -  and suspi­
ciously -  supervised from the outset.
From 1852 until the system was liberalised in 1873, a highly 
centralised, bureaucratic administrative system ordered the issue of 
railway concessions, inspection and regulation, even for companies 
franchised at provincial level. Correspondence flowed from enterprises 
to local agencies, from agency to provincial government and imperial 
ministry and from provincial administration to the central government in 
Rio de Janeiro and, in the case of foreign owned companies between 
ministries in the capital and between the ministry of foreign affairs and 
legations abroad -  and back again. This was not conducive to business 
decision-making. Even minor commercial matters would be referred to 
provincial authorities, or to Rio de Janeiro for decision. By the end of 
the Empire companies, local agencies and provincial administration 
were all complaining about the length of time required to obtain an 
‘opinion’ from imperial ministries. Imperial sclerosis was translated into 
business paralysis.
C onclusion
If the history of business-state relations in the railway sector in Brazil 
during the second half of the nineteenth century have any lessons for the 
present day process of liberalisation and privatisation, they relate to
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expectations and cultures. Despite recent policy initiatives, Brazil 
remains one o f the most statised economies in Latin America: the 
degree o f openness is low and incidence of regulation high. It is now 
recognised that efficiency and productivity gains from the privatisation 
of public enterprises, particularly in the area of basic services, requires 
the creation o f effective regulatory agencies. The problem for Brazil is 
that hitherto regulation has often been confused with intervention. This, 
coupled with a statist tradition does not augur well. Nineteenth century 
experience, notably during the Empire, also points to the need for clarity 
in agency jurisdiction. Following railway legislation in 1873-4 designed 
to facilitate decision-making at provincial level, corporate complaints 
about over-lapping or competing provincial/imperial areas of responsi­
bility mounted. Whether this was due to ingrained habits o f centralism 
or the imperfect drafting of legislation may be debated. Nevertheless, it 
highlights the need for clarity. Regulatory bodies can only facilitate 
gains anticipated from privatisation if their brief is specific and if 
granted effective powers, powers which should be exercised to establish 
the rules of the game rather than to design the decision-making process 
at firm level. This implies not only the separate responsibilities of 
official agency and enterprise but an acceptance of the distinct cultures 
of each. The function of the enterprise is to seek profit and that of the 
agency to bound the market so as to ensure effective competition.
Expectations must also be realistic. The history o f railways in late 
nineteenth-century Brazil reveals many facets of delusion as much as 
disillusion. O f themselves, railways could not drive the economic 
changes anticipated of them. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
after more than fifty years of construction, even the provinces/states of 
coastal Brazil were hardly linked together by railway lines. The limits of 
technology, topography and the nature o f the market muted the 
economic impact of infrastructural modernisation. In part dependence 
on state guarantees demonstrated that companies were not profitable. 
The traffic just was not there while many factors -  not simply greed and 
peculation -  made for high operating expenses. Railways were lumpy 
and only potentially developmental. Half a railway network is not half 
as profitable as a completed system: if  other resources were lacking 
-  labour, capital and enterprise -  railways would not inevitably promote 
production for the market. In central Brazil the EF Dorn Pedro II
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ultimately delivered anticipated political and economic functions. It 
signalled the reach o f the central state, integrating subregional markets 
and promoting production and exports. In São Paulo, railways triggered 
an impressive outward expansion of the production frontier. Elsewhere, 
railways remained marginal or, at best, performed largely political 
functions. Like the manager of the Banco do Brasil, stations masters of 
government railway companies were representatives (or symbols) o f the 
central state. The paraphernalia of railways -  tracks, marshalling yards, 
signals, the telegraph, locomotives, cargo wagons and passenger 
carriages might also have represented the market economy but they did 
not create it. Similarly, in the late twentieth century, privatised utilities 
will not of themselves transform the economic superstructure of the 
country nor are they likely to become instantly efficient or profitable 
without institutional change elsewhere.
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Bramah to Nêves Gonçales, 3 Feb. 1862, AEPPe EF VI/14-17.
Bramah to Nêves Gonçales, 3 Feb. 1862, AEPPe EF VE14-17.
Bramah to Buarque de Macedo 6 Feb. 1862, enclosed Buarque de Macedo to Nêves 
Gonçales, 6 Feb. 1862, AEPPe EF V/39-41.
São Paulo, Arquivo de Estado de São Paulo (AESP):
Antonio Corrêa Pacheco, Chief of Police, Itú, to Antonio da Costa Pinto, President of 
the Province of São Paulo, 16 Nov. 1870, AESP Ordern 1074, Lata 279, Ofícios 
diversos - Itú, 1869-90.
Copy of telegram, Vice-President of the Province of São Paulo to the Minister of 
Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works, 8 May 1871, AESP, Ordern 7879 
Lata 1 T.I. EEFF (1869/72), Livro de Cartas, 4a Secção, Estradas de Ferro.
4a Secção da Presidencia da Provincia de São Paulo to Fox, Superintendent SPR, 
19 May 1871, AESP Ordern 7879 Lata 1 T.I. EEFF (1869/72), Livro de Cartas, 
4a Secção, Estradas de Ferro.
São Paulo, State Railway Adminstration (FEPASA),
Arquivo Financiero, Jundiai:
Clemente Falcão de Souza Filho, Chairman, Companhia Paulista, to Antonio 
Cândido da Rocha, President of the Province of São Paulo, 9 Aug. 1869, de 
Souza to da Rocha, 13 June 1870, de Souza to da Rocha, 2 July 1870, de Souza 
to da Rocha, 2 Sept. 1870, de Souza to da Rocha, 15 Oct. 1870, de Souza to 
Antonio da Costa Pinto e Silva, President of the Province of São Paulo, 22 Nov. 
1870, de Souza to da Costa Pinto e Silva 3 Jan. 1871, de Souza to Antonio Pinto 
do Rêgo Freitas, Inspector of the Provincial Treasury, 17 Jan. 1871, de Souza to 
da Costa Pinto e Silva 13 March 1871, de Souza to Dr. Jose Fernandes da Costa
Pereira, President of the Province of São Paulo, 11 July 1871, de Souza to da
Costa Pereira, 3 Oct. 1871, de Souza to da Costa Pereira, 9 Jan. 1872, de Souza to 
Barão do Tiete, Vice-President of the Province of São Paulo, 13 May 1876, de 
Souza to do Tiete, 22 May 1876, Cia. Paulista, Copiador “A”, 4 Feb. 1869 - 
13 May 1876.
United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Foreign Office correspondence (FO):
Henry F. Howard, British Minister at Rio de Janeiro, to the Earl of Clarendon, 
Secretary of State, 1 May 1854, FO 13/315 pp. 138-40.
Howard to Clarendon, 5 June 1855, FO 13/330 p. 74.
H. Augustus Cowper, British Consul at Pernambuco, to Clarendon, 15 April 1856, 
FO 84/996 pp. 131-6.
Foreign Office to the Secretary of the R&SFPR, 28 May 1856 FO 13/346 pp. 143-4.
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Cowper to Clarendon, 1 March 1857, FO 13/356 pp.145-8.
Clarendon to Edward Thornton, Minister at Rio de Janeiro, 24 Jan. 1866, FO 13/438 
pp. 5-6.
Thornton to Clarendon, 7 July 1866, FO 13/437 pp. 9-15.
Consul Richard Burton, Santos, to Lord Stanley, Secretary of State, 15 April 1867, FO 
13/450 pp. 194-5.
Consul C. Dundas, Santos, to T. Clement Cobbold, Chargé d Affaires, British 
Legation, Rio de Janeiro, 6 May 1871, copy enclosed Cobbold to the Earl of 
Granville, Secretary of State, 15 May 1871, FO 13/477 p. 104.
Cobbold to Granville 14 May 1871, FO 13/477 pp. 57-9.
Cobbold to Granville, 15 May 1871, FO 13/477 p. 92 (see also attached corre­
spondence, pp. 96-114).
Cobbold to Granville, 29 May 1871 FO 13/477 119-20 (see also attached copy 
Manoel Francisco Corrêia, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Cobbold, 
23 May 1871, pp. 121-22).
The Earl of Derby, Secretary of State, to George Buckley Mathew, British Minister at 
Rio de Janeiro, 14 Sept. 1874, FO 128/102 pp. 262-5.
Derby to V. A. W. Drummon, British Chargé d Affaires at Rio de Janeiro, 12 Nov. 
1875 FO 13/511 p. 13.
P r in t e d  R e p o r t s  (a ) o f f ic ia l
Brasil, Ministerio dos Negoçios da Agricultura, Commercio e Obras Públicas (here­
after MACOP) Relatorio apresentado a assemblêa geral legislativa na terceira 
sessão da décima primera legislatura (1862).
MACOP Relatorio apresentado ao Rim. Exm. Ministro e Secretario d ’Estado dos 
Agiicultura, Commercio e Obras Públicas pelo Directoría de Obras Públicas e 
Navegação (1863).
MACOP Relatorio apresentado a assemblêa geral legislativa na primera sessão da 
décima segunda legislatura (Rio de Janeiro 1864).
MACOP Relatorio [...] segunda sessão de décima segunda legislatura (1864).
MACOP Relatorio [...] quarta sessão da décima segunda legislatura (1866).
MACOP Relatorio [...]primera sessão da décima terceira legislatura (1867).
MACOP Relatorio [...]primera sessão da décima quarta legislatura (1869).
MACOP Relatorio [...] terceira sessão da décima quarta legislatura (1871).
MACOP Relatorio [...] apresentado segunda sessão de décima quinta legislatura 
(1873).
MACOP Relatorio [...] appresentado segunda sessão de décima quinta legislatura: 
annexo P. (1873).
MACOP Relatorio [...] terceira sessão da décima quinta legislatura (1874).
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MACOP Relatorio [...] quarta sessão de décima quinta legislatura (1875).
MACOP Relatorio [...] terceira sessão da décima sétima legislatura (1880).
MACOP Relatorio [...] primera sessão da décima oitava legislatura (1882).
MACOP Relatorio [...] quarta sessão de décima oitava legislatura (1884).
MACOP Relatorio [...] segunda sessão da vigésima legislatura (1887).
MACOP Relatorio [...] quarta sessão da vigésima legislatura (1889).
Provincia de Pernambuco Relatorio que a Assemblêa Legislativa Provincial de 
Pernambuco apresentou o Exmo. Sr. Dr. Jose Bento da Cunha Figueiredo, 
presidente da provinda (Recife 1856).
Provincia de São Paulo (hereafter PSP) Discurso com que O Illustrissimo e Exce- 
llentissimo Senhor Dr. Jose Thomáz Nabuco d 'Araújo, presidente da provinda de 
S. Paulo abrió a Assemblêa Legislativa Provincial no dia Io de maio de 1852 
(São Paulo 1852).
PSP Discurso com que O Illustrissimo e Excellentissimo Senhor Dr. Jose Antonio 
Saráiva, presidente da provinda de S. Paulo, abrió a assemblêa legislativa 
provincial no dia 15 de fevereiro de 1855 (São Paulo 1855).
PSP Discurso com que O Illustrissimo e Excellentissimo Senhor Doutor Antonio 
Roberto d ’Alameida, vice-presidente da provinda de S. Paulo, abrió a assemblêa 
legislativa provincial no dia 15 de fevereiro de 1856 (São Paulo 1856).
PSP Relatorio apresentado a assemblêa provincial de S. Paulo pelo presidente 
Desembargador Jose Tavares Bastos na sessão de 12 de maio de 1867 (Rio de 
Janeiro 1867).
PSP Relatorio apresentado a assemblêa Legislativa provincial de São Paulo na 
primera sessão da décima oitava legislatura no dia 2 de fevereiro de 1868 pelo 
presidente da misma provinda o conselheiro Joaquim Saldanha Marinho (São 
Paulo 1868).
PSP Relatorio apresentado a Assemblêa Legislativa Provincial de S. Paulo pelo 
presidente da provinda O Exm. Sr. Dr. Antonio Cândido da Rocha no dia 2 de 
fevereiro de 1870 (São Paulo 1870).
PSP Relatorio apresentado a assemblêa legislativa provincial de São Paulo pelo 
presidente de provinda O Exm. Sr. Dr. Jose Fernandes da Costa Pereira Junior 
etn 2 de fevereiro de 1872 (São Paulo 1872).
PSP Annaes da Assemblêa Legislativa Provincial de São Paulo: sessão de 1873 (São 
Paulo 1873).
PSP Relatorio apresentado a assemblêa legislative provincial de São Paulo pelo 
presidente da provinda Dr. Pedro Vicente de Azevedo no dia 11 de janeiro de 
1889 (São Paulo 1889).
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P r in t e d  R e p o r t s  (b) r a il w a y  c o m p a n y
Companhia Ituana, Estatutos da Companhia Ituana approvadospelo decreto n° 4554 
de 30 de julho de 1870 (São Paulo 1871).
Companhia Paulista (hereafter CP), Relatorio da directoría da Companhia Paulista 
para a sessão de assemblêa geral de accionistas de 4 de setembro de 1875 (São 
Paulo 1875).
CP Relatorio da directoría da Companhia Paulista para a sessão de assemblêa geral 
de accionistas de 20 de fevereiro de 1876 (São Paulo 1876).
CP Relatorio da directoría da Companhia Paulista para a sessão de assemblêa geral 
de accionistas de 25 de agosto de 1877 (São Paulo 1877).
CP Relatorio da directoría da Companhia Paulista para a sessão de assemblêa geral 
de accionistas de 28 de fevereiro de 1878 (São Paulo 1878).
CP Relatorio da directoría da Companhia Paulista apresentado na sessão de assem­
blêa geral de 26 de fe \’ereiro de 1882 (São Paulo 1882).
CP Relatorio da directoría da Companhia Paulista para a sessão de assemblêa geral 
de agosto de 1883 (São Paulo 1883).
CP Relatorio n° 31 da Companhia Paulista para a sessão de assemblêa geral de 
março de 1884 (São Paulo 1884).
CP Relatorio da directoría da Companhia Paulista para a sessão de assemblêa geral 
de agosto de 1884 (São Paulo 1884).
CP Relatorio da directoría da Companhia Paulista para a sessão de assemblêa geral 
de março de 1885 (São Paulo 1885).
CP Estatutos da Companhia Paulista acompanhados de uma tabella para contagem 
de votos dos accionistas, contracto com o governo provincial a concessoes do 
governo geral (São Paulo 1870).
Companhia Sorocabana, Relatorio da directoría da Companhia Estrada de Ferro 
Sorocabana apresentado nos senhores accionistas na assemblêa geral celebrada 
em 11 de dezembro de 1882 (Rio de Janeiro 1882).
Brazilian Railway, Tlie Recife and São Francisco Pernambuco Railway Company 
(hereafter R&SFPR) Guaranteed 7per cent: prospectus (London 1855).
R&SFPR Report and Abstract o f  Receipts and Payments to 1 August 1857 (London 
1857).
R&SFPR Proceedings at the Extraordinary General Meeting, 20 December 1861 
(London 1862).
R&SFPR Proceedings at the Extraordinary General Meeting, 20 Dec. 1861 (London 
1862).
R&SFPR Proceedings at the Extraordinary General Meeting, 20 Dec. 1861 (London
1862).
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R&SFPR Report o f  Proceedings at the XHIth Half-yearly Meeting, April 1862 
(London 1862).
R&SFPR Reply o f  the Chairman and Board o f  Directors o f  the Recife & São 
Francisco Pernambuco Railway Company Limited to the respective reports o f  the 
English and Brazilian commissioners appointed by the Imperial Government to 
inquire into the capital expenditure o f  the Company, and in continuation o f  their 
Statement o f  6th May, 1862, in reference to the Company’s Petition (London
1863).
R&SFPR The Recife & São Francisco Pernambuco Railway Company Limited and 
the Federal Government o f  the United States o f  Brazil, Agreement (London 
1901).
N e w s p a p e r s  a n d  M a g a z in e s
Corrêio Paulistano, 16 May 1880.
The Brazilian Review, 9 May 1899.
The Railway Times, 16 Sept. 1882; 25 Aug. 1888; 3 June 1899.
The Economist, 9 Nov. 1901.
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